##Cooperative Game Theory
###Introduction to the Shapley Value
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####Vincent Knight
[www.vincent-knight.com](http://www.vincent-knight.com)
##Alice and Bob share a taxi:
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- It costs Alice £5 to get home.
- It costs Bob £12 to get home (this will be the total fare).
- Alice lives on Bob's way home.
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When Alice gets out of the cab, how much should she pay?
Cooperative Games
- $N=\{1,\dots,n\}$ players.
- Coalitions $S\subseteq N$.
Examples:
- $S_1=\{2,5\}$
- $S_2=\{1\}$
- $S_2=N$
- $S_2=\emptyset$
Characteristic Function Games
A characteristic game $G$ is given by a pair: $(N,v)$. Where:
$$v:2^{N}\to\mathbb{R}$$
is a characteristic function which maps each coalition $S\subseteq N$ to a real number $v(S)$.
Taxi Problem
$N=\{A,B\}$
and we have:
- $v(\emptyset)=0$
- $v(A)=5$
- $v(B)=12$
- $v(A,B)=12$
Monotone Games
A characteristic function game $G=(N,v)$ is said to be monotone if it satisfies $v(S_2)\geq v(S_1)$ for all pairs $S_1\subseteq S_2$.
Superadditive Games
A characteristic function game $G=(N,v)$ is said to be superadditive if it satisfies $v(S_1\cup S_2)\geq v(S_1)+v(S_2)$ for all pairs $S_1,S_2\subseteq N$.
Solution Concepts
The 'solution' of a superadditive game corresponds to a vector: $x\in\mathbb{R}^{|N|}_{\geq0}$ that satisfies:
$$\sum_{i\in N}x_i=v(N)$$
Fair Distribution
- Efficiency: $\sum_{i\in N}x_i=v(N)$;
- Null player: if $i$ does not contribute, then $x_i=0$;
- Symmetry: if $i$ and $j$ are symmetric in then $x_i=x_j$;
- Additivity: (look it up if you're interested).
Taxi Problem
$\pi$ |
Alice |
Bob |
(A,B) |
5 |
7 |
(B,A) |
0 |
12 |
$\phi$
|
2.5
|
9.5
|
Shapley Value
Given a characteristic function game $G=(N,v)$ the Shapley value of a player $i\in N$ is given by:
$$\phi_{i}(G)={1\over |N|!}\sum_{\pi\in\Pi_N}\Delta_{\pi}^{G}(i)$$
##Why am I telling you this?
##Applying this to group work
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- Assume Amy, Bernard and Caroline work on a group project.
- Assume the marking criteria states: 70% output and 30% group work.
- Assume the total mark given to the project is 85%.
Contributions
$S$ |
$v(S)$ |
$A$ |
40 |
$B$ |
40 |
$C$ |
20 |
$\{A,B\}$ |
70 |
$\{A,C\}$ |
60 |
$\{B,C\}$ |
40 |
Shapley Value Calculation
$\pi$ |
Amy |
Bernard |
Caroline |
(A,B,C) |
$40$ |
$30$ |
$30$ |
(A,C,B) |
$40$ |
$40$ |
$20$ |
(B,A,C) |
$30$ |
$40$ |
$30$ |
(B,C,A) |
$60$ |
$40$ |
$0$ |
(C,A,B) |
$40$ |
$40$ |
$20$ |
(C,B,A) |
$60$ |
$20$ |
$20$ |
$\phi$
|
$45$
|
$35$
|
$20$
|
Mark Calculation
$$\text{m}(i)=\text{M}\times\left(\text{OP}+\text{CW}\times{\phi(i)\over \max_j{\phi(j)}}\right)$$
Fair Marks
- Efficiency: only way to maximise group mark is equal contribution;
- Null player: if $i$ does not contribute, then $m(i)=0$;
- Symmetry: if $i$ and $j$ contribute equally, they get the same mark.
$$\text{m}(A)=85\times(.7+.3)=85$$
$$\text{m}(B)=85\times\left(.7+.3\times {35\over 45}\right)={238\over 3}\approx 79.33$$
$$\text{m}(C)=85\times\left(.7+.3\times{20\over45}\right)={425\over 6}\approx 70.83$$
##Resources
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- [A sage interact](http://interact.sagemath.org/node/80)
- [A spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ah_zrw5uAafbdFBfVmdyUUZweXhFNTRTWGlSOXlKNUE)
The real problem...
How do we get $\phi$?