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Professor Jeff Griffiths

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,2) & (5,0) \\ (0,5) & (4,4) \end{pmatrix}$$


$PoA(\Lambda)$
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
Λ
$\beta=40$
$\beta=70$
$\beta=100$

What about the controllers?

What about the controllers?

S. Deo and I. Gurvich. **Centralized vs. Decentralized Ambulance Diversion: A Network Perspective.** *Management Science*, 57(7):13001319, May 2011.


0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Data
Model
Proportion
0-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
>90%
Procentage of beds occupied



Mathematical modelling of patient flows to predict critical care capacity required following the merger of two District General Hospitals into one., *Submitted to Anaesthesia*



Divert?
RG
NH
Divert?


K_{RG}
K_{NH}
$\lambda_h^{(a)}$
$\lambda_h^{(b)}$
$\lambda_h^{(c)}$
$\lambda_h^{(d)}$



(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(0, 2)
(0, K_RG)
(0, c_RG)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, K_RG)
(1, c_RG)
(2, 0)
(2, 1)
(2, 2)
(2, K_RG)
(2, c_RG)
(K_NH, 0)
(K_NH, 1)
(K_NH, 2)
(K_NH, K_RG)
(K_NH, c_RG)
(c_NH, 0)
(c_NH, 1)
(c_NH, 2)
(c_NH, K_RG)
(c_NH, c_RG)



$\lambda_{RG}^{(a)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(b)}$
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(a)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(b)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(b)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{RG}^{(c)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(d)}$
(K_{NH}, K_{RG})
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(c)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(d)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{NH}^{(d)}$
μ_{NH}
$\lambda_{RG}^{(c)}$
$\lambda_{RG}^{(d)}$
μ_{RG}
μ_{RG}

$(K_{\mathrm{NH}}, K_{\mathrm{RG}}) = (6, 12)$:



$h = NH$



$h = RG$

$(K_{\mathrm{NH}}, K_{\mathrm{RG}}) = (1, 12)$:



$h = \mathrm{NH}$



$h = \mathrm{RG}$

For all $h \in \{\mathrm{NH}, \mathrm{RG}\}$ minimise:

$$(U_h - t)^2$$

Subject to:

$$0 \leq K_h \leq c_h$$
$$K_h \in \mathbb{Z}$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(1,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(1, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(2,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(2, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(c_{\mathsf{NH}},1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{NH}}(c_{\mathsf{NH}}, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(1,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(1, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(2,1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(2, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(c_{\mathsf{RG}},1) - t)^2 & \dots & (U_{\mathsf{RG}}(c_{\mathsf{RG}}, c_{\mathsf{RG}}) - t)^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Theorem.
Let $f_h(k) : [1, c_{\bar{h}}] \rightarrow [1, c_h]$ be the best response of player $h \in \{\text{NH}, \text{RG}\}$ to the diversion threshold of $\bar{h} \neq h$ ($\bar{h} \in \{\text{NH}, \text{RG}\}$). If $f_h(k)$ is a non-decreasing function in k then the game has at least one Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.


K_{NH}
K_{RG}


K_{NH}
K_{RG}



Lemma.

- If $\lambda_{\text{NH}}^{(a)} \leq \lambda_{\text{NH}}^{(b)}$ and $\lambda_{\text{NH}}^{(c)} \leq \lambda_{\text{NH}}^{(d)}$ then $f_{\text{NH}}(k)$ is a non-decreasing function in k.
- If $\lambda_{\text{RG}}^{(a)} \leq \lambda_{\text{RG}}^{(c)}$ and $\lambda_{\text{RG}}^{(b)} \leq \lambda_{\text{RG}}^{(d)}$ then $f_{\text{RG}}(k)$ is a non-decreasing function in k.



U_{NH}
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
K_{RG}
$f_{NH}(3) = m$
$f_{NH}(4) = m+1$
$f_{NH}(5) = m+1$
t
$K_{NH} = m+1$
$K_{NH} = m$
$K_{NH} = m-1$
$K_{NH} = m+2$



K_{NH}
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Best response to RG
Best response to NH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
K_{RG}

$(t = 0.8)$



K_{NH}
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Best response to RG
Best response to NH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
K_{RG}

$(t = 0.6)$

$$\mathrm{PoA} = \frac{T^*}{\widetilde{T}}$$



PoA
0.1
0.23
0.36
0.49
0.61
0.74
0.87
t
-0.9
-0.54
-0.18
0.18
0.54
0.91
1.27
1.63
x
1.056
1.048
1.040
1.032
1.024
1.016
1.008
1.000



$\text{argmin}_t(\text{PoA}(x))$
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
-0.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
x

Conclusions

- Developed a strategic form game representation of CCU interaction;
- Proved structural properties of equilibrium behaviour;
- Identified a potential justified approach to obtaining policies.

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Measuring the Price of Anarchy in Critical Care Unit Interactions, *Submitted to OMEGA*

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